09 Chapter 8.indd

In a letter to the editor of the Mercury News , one reader explained his views on the death penalty as follows: “ I ’ ll vote to abolish the death penalty . . . and not just because it is fi scally imprudent with unsustainable costs versus a life sentence without possibility of parole. More importantly, it ’ s morally wrong. Making us and the state murderers — through exercising the death penalty — is a pure illogicality akin to saying ‘ two wrongs make a right ’ ” (Mercury News 2012). In short, this letter writer believes murder is simply wrong, regardless of whether it is an individual or state action, and for no other reason than because it is simply and purely wrong. Attitudes rooted in moral conviction (or “ moral mandates ” ), such as the letter writer ’ s position on the death penalty, represent a unique class of strong attitudes. Strong attitudes are more extreme, important, central, certain, and/ or accessible, and are also more stable, enduring, and predictive of behavior than attitudes weaker on these dimensions (see Krosnick and Petty 1995 for a review). Attitudes held with the strength of moral conviction, even if they share many of the same characteristics of strong attitudes, are distinguished by a sense of imperative and unwillingness to compromise even in the face of competing desires or concerns. Someone might experience their attitude about chocolate, for example, in extreme, important, certain, and central terms, but still decide not to order chocolate cake at a restaurant because of the calories. Vanity, or other motives such as health or cost, can trump even people ’ s very strong preferences. Attitudes rooted in moral conviction, however, are much less likely to be compromised or vulnerable to trade off (cf. Tetlock et al. 2000).