Property Dualism and the Knowledge Argument: Are Qualia Really a Problem for Physicalism?
نویسنده
چکیده
Where does the mind fit into the physical world? Not surprisingly, philosophers have offered radically different answers to this question. This paper considers and defends an argument to the effect that our conscious experiences must be something separate from the physical world since one could in principle know all the relevant physical and neuroscientific details without knowing anything about what it is like to actually have such experiences. Accordingly, I first present the premises and conclusion of the argument and then consider two popular ways of responding to it, highlighting some serious problems each of these strategies faces.
منابع مشابه
Why property dualists must reject substance physicalism
I argue that property dualists cannot hold that minds are physical substances. The focus of my discussion is a property dualism that takes qualia to be sui generis features of reality.
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