Intentional Vagueness ∗ Andreas Blume and Oliver Board
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper analyzes communication with a language that is vague in the sense that identical messages do not always result in identical interpretations. It is shown that strategic agents frequently add to this vagueness by being intentionally vague, i.e. they deliberately choose less precise messages than they have to among the ones available to them in equilibrium. Having to communicate with a vague language can be welfare enhancing because it mitigates conflict. In equilibria that satisfy a dynamic stability condition intentional vagueness increases with the degree of conflict between sender and receiver.
منابع مشابه
Intentional Vagueness ∗
This paper analyzes communication with a language that is vague in the sense that identical messages do not always result in identical interpretations. It is shown that strategic agents frequently add to this vagueness by being intentionally vague, i.e. they deliberately choose less precise messages than they have to among the ones available to them in equilibrium. Having to communicate with a ...
متن کاملCognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: An experimental study
This paper investigates optimal play in coordination games in which cognition plays an important role. In our game logically omniscient players would be able to identify a distinct coordination opportunity from other obvious facts. Real players may be unable to make the required inference. Our main experimental results are that in a coordination task with a cognitive component (1) players play ...
متن کاملOptimal Learning in Coordination Games
An Experimental Investigation of Optimal Learning in Coordination Games by Andreas Blume and Uri Gneezy This paper presents an experimental investigation of optimal learning in repeated coordination games. We find evidence for such learning when we limit both the cognitive demands on players and the information available to them. We also find that uniqueness of the optimal strategy is no guaran...
متن کاملA class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games
This paper shows that the efficiency bound for communication equilibria identified by Goltsman, Hörner, Pavlov and Squintani [15] in the leading example of the CrawfordSobel model can be obtained with strategy-correlated equilibria, thus preserving privacy vis-à-vis the mediator. More generally, all equilibrium outcomes of the -noise model of Blume, Board and Kawamura [4], including outcomes wi...
متن کاملA Hybrid Representation of Vague Collections for Distributed Object Management Systems
ÐAn important characteristic of distributed object management systems is that due to network or machine failure, the environment may become partitioned into subenvironments that cannot communicate with each other. In some application scenarios, it is important that the subenvironments remain operable even in this case. In particular, queries should be processed in an appropriate way. To this en...
متن کامل