Fictitious play in 2×n games
نویسنده
چکیده
It is known that every continuous time fictitious play process approaches equilibrium in every nondegenerate 2×2 and 2×3 game, and it has been conjectured that convergence to equilibrium holds generally for 2×n games. We give a simple geometric proof of this. As a corollary, we obtain the same result for the discrete fictitious play process. Journal of Economic Literature classification numbers: C72, D83.
منابع مشابه
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عنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 120 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2000