Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets and the Non-cooperative Solution to the Bargaining Problem
نویسندگان
چکیده
We establish a general n-player link between non-cooperative bargaining and the Nash solution. Non-cooperative bargaining is captured in a reduced form through the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stability concept. A stable set always exists. Moreover, if the utility set has a smooth surface, then any stable set converges to the Nash bargaining solution. Finally, the equivalence of stationary equilibria of the unanimity bargaining game and the stable set solution is demonstrated. JEL Classification: C71, C78
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