The Selves and the Shoemaker: Psychopaths, Moral Judgement, and Responsibility

David Shoemaker argues from (A) psychopaths’ emotional deficiency, to (B) their insensitivity to moral reasons, to (C) their lack of criminal responsibility. This response observes three important ambiguities in this argument, involving the interpretation of (1) psychopaths’ emotional deficit, (2) their insensitivity to reasons, and (3) their moral judgements. Resolving these ambiguities presents Shoemaker with a dilemma: his argument either equivocates or it is falsified by the empirical evidence. An alternative perspective on psychopaths’ moral and criminal responsibility is proposed. Much in David Shoemaker’s rich and provocative article (this volume) seems exactly right. I’m convinced by his demolition of the moral/conventional distinction and his observations about the authority-dependence of some moral reasons. But I have doubts about his diagnosis of the moral judgements of psychopaths and the conclusions he draws from it. I first highlight some ambiguities he has left unresolved, and show that they conceal a dilemma. Then I sketch a contrary view on psychopaths’ criminal and moral responsibility. 1. Three Ambiguities Broadly, Shoemaker argues from (A) psychopaths’ emotional deficiency, to (B) their insensitivity to moral reasons, to (C) their lack of moral responsibility. My concern is with three ambiguities. I see no way of resolving these on which his argument is both valid and plausible, at once avoiding equivocation and fitting the psychological evidence (from Blair 1995) he seeks to accommodate. I’ll start by identifying two of these ambiguities; we’ll encounter the third later. The first ambiguity concerns the nature of psychopaths’ emotional deficiency. Does psychopathy involve a deficit merely in feeling (or sharing) others’ emotions, or does it involve a deficit additionally in understanding others’ emotions? Feeling Deficit: psychopaths are deficient merely in feeling others’ emotions. Understanding Deficit: psychopaths are deficient also in understanding others’ emotions. The second ambiguity involves the sense in which psychopaths are claimed to be ‘insensitive to moral reasons’. We can distinguish two broad ways of interpreting this; 1 Shoemaker’s position is more nuanced since he limits his claims to some kinds of moral reasons and moral responsibility, but for economy I’ll omit these qualifications.