Is Putin the New de Gaulle? A Comparison of the Chechen and Algerian Wars

An expert on the conflict in Chechnya explores the parallels between France’s Algerian war and Russia’s war in Chechnya to understand why the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the Chechen war have appeared so elusive. Using histories of the conflict, interviews, the accounts of journalists and participants, and scholarly analyses, comparisons are made on several dimensions, including the colonial histories of the two regions, new leaders’ approaches to the conflicts, and gendered aspects of the wars. Possibilities for a peaceful resolution in Chechnya are considered in the context of the complex issues of how civil wars end. n the weeks leading up to his election as president of Russia in March 2000, Vladimir Putin was asked by journalists which political leaders he found “most interesting.” His first answer, Napoleon Bonaparte, they took as a joke, so he offered as his second choice Charles de Gaulle (Putin, 2000, p. 194). One can easily see the appeal of the French general who came to power in the wake of the failed Fourth Republic, determined to revive France’s grandeur, to “restore state authority,” as he put it, and to create a strong, centralized, presidential republic (Stora, 2001, p. 71; Horne, 1977; Werth, 1969). Putin had from the start expressed similar aspirations for Russia. 1Professor of Government, Cornell University. This article is an expanded version of a paper originally prepared for the Program on New Approaches to Security (PONARS) and published in the Polish magazine Forum (Evangelista, 2004). A subsequent draft was presented at the workshop on “Colonial Experiences and Colonial Legacies: Comparing Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa,” held at Cornell University in May 2005. For comments and suggestions I thank Benjamin Brower, Jai Kwan Jung, my PONARS colleagues, the Cornell workshop participants, and this journal’s editor. I COMPARISON OF CHECHEN AND ALGERIAN WARS 361 De Gaulle’s rise to power was also intimately linked to France’s military campaign to maintain control of its North African colony, Algeria. The Fourth Republic’s demise was caused by a protest movement of European colons there in May 1958. They were dissatisfied with the inability of the Paris government to win the war it had been waging for four years against Algerian independence fighters. General de Gaulle’s initial support, as he agreed to form a new government with a new constitution and strong presidential powers, depended heavily on his promise to keep Algeria French. Yet four years later, in July 1962, he held a referendum on Algeria’s status and accepted the result—Algeria’s full independence. Vladimir Putin’s popularity as prime minister, acting president, and then president was closely associated with his approach to the conflict in Chechnya. His strong response to the incursions by Wahhabi forces from Chechnya into Dagestan in August 1999 gave an invaluable boost to his political career. In retrospect, many observers believe that de Gaulle, despite his early popularity with the army putschists, harbored a long-term plan to extricate France from Algeria—ideally after defeating the rebels militarily. Putin’s long-term plan for Chechnya is a mystery, probably even to himself. An exploration of the parallels between Algeria and Chechnya, and between de Gaulle and Putin, might, however, shed some light on why the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the Chechen war have appeared so elusive. This article presents comparisons on several dimensions: the colonial histories of the two regions, the path from peaceful protest to violent conflict in each case, the appearance on the scene of a new leader and how he approached the choice of negotiation versus escalation, and the role of gender identities and women’s relationship to violence. It discusses missed opportunities for peaceful resolution of both conflicts and considers the particular barriers to a negotiated solution to the Chechen war in light of the Algerian case. It concludes with a review of the literature in international and comparative politics on the end of civil wars for what insights it may provide into the Chechen case.