A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems
نویسندگان
چکیده
Article history: Received 2 March 2015 Available online 10 July 2015 JEL classification: C70 D44 D60 D82
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 101 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2017