The Distinction Between Equality in Moral Status and Deserving Equal Consideration

Passions tend to run high in ethical debates concerning animals, not only among laypersons and in political arenas, but also in the nonnally cool chambers of academic philosophy. Objectivity and care, though indispensable for understanding differing positions and their supporting arguments, often seem in short supply. As a result, distinct issues are confused while arguments are misunderstood and then misrepresented in counterarguments. This essay concerns two normative concepts whose conflation in animal ethics debates easily leads to intellectual mischief: (1) equality in moral status, and (2) one's interests' having moral weight equal to the identical interests of others. (2), which is difficult to fonnulate precisely without awkwardness, might also be put in this way: one's interests' deserving equal consideration to the identical interests ofothers. After distinguishing and clarifying these concepts, I present a preliminary case for the thesis that animals are unequal in moral status-though their interests should be given equal consideration. In making my case I note some general implications for the use of nonhuman animals (hereafter, simply "animals") in research. Let me begin by presenting a couple of examples of the confusions to which I refer. First, in a widely read article, Katie McCabe, a journalist, makes a seemingly innocuous attribution: "Singer argues that all sentient beings have equal moral status "1 Once equal moral status and equal consideration are distinguished, given a general familiarity with Singer's work, it becomes clear that this attribution is false, or at least very uncertain-though Singer unequivocally argues for equal consideration. These words from philosopher Carl Cohen will serve as a starting point for disentangling these concepts (providing a second example):