Purification of Bayesian-Nash Equilibria in Large Games with Compact Type and Action Spaces∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We present a purification result for incomplete information games with a large but finite number of players that allows compact metric spaces for both actions and types. We then compare our framework and findings to the early purification theorems of Rashid (1983), Cartwright and Wooders (2002), Kalai (2004) and Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2006). Our proofs are elementary and rely on the Shapley-Folkman theorem. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72.
منابع مشابه
Ex-post stability of Bayes-Nash equilibria of large games
We present a result on approximate ex-post stability of Bayes-Nash equilibria in semi-anonymous Bayesian games with a large finite number of players. The result allows players’ action and type spaces to be general compact metric spaces, thus extending a result by Kalai (2004). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72
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