Udine Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche Working Paper Series in Economics “ Very Nice ” Trivial Equilibria in Strategic Market Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
Following Shapley (1976), we study the problem of the existence of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) in which each trading post is either active or “legitimately” inactive, and we call it a Shapley NE. We consider an example of an exchange economy, borrowed from Cordella and Gabszewicz (1998), which satisfies the assumptions of Dubey and Shubik (1978), and we show that the trivial equilibrium, the unique NE of the associated strategic market game, is not “very nice,” in the sense that it is not “legitimately” trivial. This result has the more general implication that, under the Dubey and Shubik’s assumptions, a Shapley NE may fail to exist. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D51.
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