Learning in Extensive-Form Games I. Self-Confirming Equilibria
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چکیده
A group of individuals repeatedly plays a fixed extensive-form game, using past play to forecast future actions. Each (asymptotically) maximizes his own immediate expected payoff, believing that others' play corresponds to the historical frequencies of past play. Because players observe only the path of play in each round, they may not learn how others act in parts of the game tree that are not reached infinitely often. Hence, differences and correlations in beliefs about outof-equilibrium actions may persist indefinitely. The stable points of these learning processes are self-confirming equilibria, a weaker solution concept than Nash equilibria. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D83. © 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
منابع مشابه
Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with Funding from Boston Library Consortium Iviember Libraries Working Paper Department of Economics Self -confirming Equilibrium
Self-confirming equilibrium differs from Nash equilibrium in allowing players to have incorrect beliefs about how their opponents would play off of the equilibrium path. We provide several examples of ways that self-confirming and Nash equilibria differ. In games with "identified deviators , " all self -confirming equilibrium outcomes can be generated by extensive -form correlated equilibria. I...
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