The All-pay Auction with Independent Private Values
نویسنده
چکیده
In the independent private values setting, we provide sufficient conditions for the continuity and uniqueness of the allpay auction equilibrium. We also provide an algorithm to compute the equilibrium. Preliminary and incomplete. Please, do not cite or quote without permission.
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