Distribute the Selfish Ambitions
نویسندگان
چکیده
The distributed project scheduling problem is a distributed resource allocation problem extended with temporal constraints. Herein a project consists of a series of activities, the scarce resources are assigned to those activities at certain time windows such that all the activities are performed and certain objectives are optimized. In the past, methods from Operations Research (OR) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) were proposed to tackle this problem in a centralized manner. However, such centralized methods appear to be for many real-world applications impractical and infeasible due to the distribution of information, changes in willingness to cooperate and the decision autonomy of individual actors. Furthermore, long term schedules are likely to be invalidated by the dynamic changes in the environment. In this paper, we investigate this more dynamic problem in the context of Airport Ground Handling (AGH), where airlines and ground handlers are working together to deliver ground services during aircraft turnaround times. Although parties involved in AGH process cooperate, they may have their own selfish ambitions. For instance, in the scheduling process, airlines and ground service providers do not share a unified objective. In this paper, a multiagent online heuristic approach is proposed. We employ in this approach a market mechanism that balances the interests of airlines and ground service providers for scheduling the AGH services. The experimental results show that this multiagent approach provides a schedule that is of comparable quality as a centralized heuristic approach, and that by letting self-interested agents behave cooperatively, the overall schedule is significantly improved.
منابع مشابه
Barter trade improves message delivery in opportunistic networks
In opportunistic networks, selfish nodes can exploit the services provided by other nodes by downloading messages that interest them, but refusing to store and distribute messages for the benefit of other nodes. We propose a mechanism to discourage selfish behavior based on the principles of barter. We develop a game-theoretic model in which we show that the proposed approach indeed stimulates ...
متن کاملStimulating Cooperation in MANETs Using Game Theory
The existence of selfish nodes, who do not cooperate in routing and forwarding, menaces the applicability of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). In this paper, we propose a novel price-based method for stimulating cooperation among the nodes of a MANET. This method utilizes the game-theoretic notion of core to distribute the earnings of a cooperation coalition among its members in an optimal manne...
متن کاملOptimal Selfish Mining Strategies in Bitcoin
Bitcoin is a decentralized crypto-currency, and an accompanying protocol, created in 2008. Bitcoin nodes continuously generate and propagate blocks—collections of newly approved transactions that are added to Bitcoin’s ledger. Block creation requires nodes to invest computational resources, but also carries a reward in the form of bitcoins that are paid to the creator. While the protocol requir...
متن کاملComputational Coalition Formation
In many multiagent systems, agents can improve their performance by forming coalitions, i.e., pooling their efforts and resources so as to achieve the tasks at hand in a more efficient way. This holds both for cooperative agents, i.e., agents who share a common set of goals, and for selfish agents who only care about their own payoffs. For cooperative agents, to find the optimal collaboration p...
متن کاملStackelberg Scheduling Strategies (DRAFT – DO NOT DISTRIBUTE)
We study the problem of optimizing the performance of a system shared by selfish, noncooperative users. We consider the concrete setting of scheduling jobs on a set of shared machines with loaddependent latency functions specifying the length of time necessary to complete a job; we measure system performance by the total latency of the system. Assigning jobs according to the selfish interests o...
متن کامل