Information sharing in a supply chain with a make-to-stock manufacturer ¬リニ

We study ex ante information sharing in a supply chain consisting of a downstream retailer and a maketo-stock upstream manufacturer. The retailer has imperfect demand information and may choose to share it with the manufacturer. Based on the information sharing arrangement, the manufacturer makes the wholesale price and the stocking level decisions. Then the retailer decides the order quantity and the manufacturer fulfills the order up to the available stock level. We find that the retailer has an incentive to voluntarily share the information with the make-to-stock manufacturer if the magnitude of demand uncertainty is intermediate. This stands in sharp contrast with the existing studies which show that the retailer never shares information when the manufacturer is make-to-order. Our results highlight the interdependence between the retailer's incentive to share information and the manufacturer's operational and marketing decisions. & 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.