Working Paper Series Economic Growth, Liquidity, and Bank Runs Wp 03-01 Huberto M. Ennis Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Growth, Liquidity, and Bank Runs
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چکیده
We construct an endogenous growth model in which bank runs occur with positive probability in equilibrium. In this setting, a bank run has a permanent effect on the levels of the capital stock and of output. In addition, the possibility of a run changes the portfolio choices of depositors and of banks, and thereby affects the long-run growth rate. These facts imply that both the occurrence of a run and the mere possibility of runs in a given period have a large impact on all future periods. A bank run in our model is triggered by sunspots, and we consider two different equilibrium selection rules. In the first, a run occurs with a fixed, exogenous probability, while in the second the probability of a run is influenced by banks' portfolio choices. We show that when the choices of an individual bank affect the probability of a run on that bank, the economy both grows faster and experiences fewer runs. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E42, G21, O42
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تاریخ انتشار 2003