A Means-End Classification of Argumentation Schemes

Argumentation schemes have been developed in argumentation theory as stereotypical patterns of inference, abstract structures representing the material (semantic) relation and logical relation between the premises and a conclusion in an argument with a corresponding set of critical questions indicating their defeasibility conditions (Walton et al. 2008). They can be regarded as the modern interpretation and reconsideration of the ancient maxims of inference (Walton et al. 2008; Walton and Macagno 2006). Many authors in the last 50 years have proposed different sets and classifications of schemes (see Hastings 1963; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969; Kienpointner 1992a, b; Walton 1996; Grennan 1997; Walton et al. 2008; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004). These approaches raise crucial problems concerning the criteria used for distinguishing and classifying the schemes, and defining the structure of an argumentation scheme. These apparently purely philosophical questions are becoming increasingly important for practical purposes, in particular the application of the schemes to the field of education (Macagno and Konstantinidou 2013; Nussbaum 2011; Duschl 2008; Kim et al. 2012; Rapanta et al. 2013) and Artificial Intelligence (Mochales and Moens 2009, 2011). The purpose of this paper is to address the problem of classifying the schemes, starting from the analysis of their nature and structure. The different components of the natural patterns of arguments will be distinguished, and in particular the quasi-logical and the semantic levels. These distinctions will be used to show the shortcomings of the existing classifications, and to propose a new model based on the pragmatic purpose of an argument, which is regarded as a move (speech act) in a dialogue.