Noisy Evolution in Normal Form Games
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper analyzes a stochastic model of evolution in normal form games. The long-run behavior of individuals in this model is investigated in the limit where mutation rates tend to zero, while the expected number of mutations, and hence population sizes, tend to infinity. It is shown that weakly dominated strategies do not survive evolution. Also strategies which are not rationalizable in the game obtained from the original game by the deletion of all weakly dominated strategies disappear in the long-run. Furthermore it is shown that if evolution leads to a unique prediction this prediction must be equivalent to a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. JEL classification: C62, C72, C73
منابع مشابه
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