India’s Ballistic Missile Defense: Implications for South Asian Deterrence Stability Asingle

Asingle factor may not fully explain the rationale for India’s quest for a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system. Security, prestige, and an aspiration for power projection are predominant factors in New Delhi’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, as well as in its pursuit of a BMD system. Particularly after the 2005 India–U.S. nuclear deal, which allowed the United States to provide nuclearrelated facilities that India would only use for peaceful purposes, New Delhi has strived for a nuclear strategy that will not only include a nuclear triad (missiles, aircrafts, submarines), but also a successful operationalization of a BMD system to meet its geopolitical and geostrategic goals in the region. This in turn would make India one of five countries—in addition to the United States, Russia, China, and Israel—to have an operational BMD system. Since its first BMD test in 2006, India has carried out more than ten tests, three of which have confronted failure. In both February and March 2017, India subsequently tested a high-altitude interceptor missile designed to enhance the “kill” probability of incoming ballistic missiles both inside (endo) and outside (exo) the earth’s atmosphere. On these recent BMD tests, one of India’s defense officials stated that, “all the mission objectives were successfully met. The weapon system radars tracked the target and provided the initial guidance to