A Construct for Testing Effective Cooperation in Large-Scale Resource Social Dilemmas∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
Social dilemmas are conflicts between individual rationality and general welfare. The literature explains how to evaluate effectiveness of cooperation based on trust mechanism in small-scale social dilemmas, but how to evaluate effectiveness of cooperation mechanisms in large-scale situations remain unknown until this paper. We designed a construct to test cooperation mechanisms used to promote cooperation in large-scale social dilemmas that involve resource depletion. The proposed construct integrates cooperation mechanisms like trust, perception of damage and cooperation as norm. Results suggest that the designed artifact explains how mechanisms promote cooperative behavior in large-scale social dilemmas that involve resource depletion. In these cases dynamic complexity affects cooperation. The research finally indicates how cooperation ∗This paper is a result of the research project titled: A Construct for Testing Effective Cooperation in LargeScale Resource Social Dilemmas. This project was developed as a Ph.D. Thesis in Engineering Area Systems at Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Medellı́n.
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