Cooperation in a dynamic fishing game: A framed field experiment

We derive a dynamic theoretical model that tests the social optimum and selfish Nash equilibrium of a renewable resource, a stock of fish. In the social optimum, maximum fishing effort is observed in the last period only. The predictions are tested at a recreational fishing pond. The subjects, experienced recreational fishermen, are placed in groups of four and face a dynamic social dilemma. The results show strong support for the selfish Nash equilibrium. Fishermen exert as much effort in the last period as in the preceding periods, and effort is independent of the stock of fish. ∗Noussair: Tilburg University, Department of Economics and CentER, Tilburg, the Netherlands, [email protected]. van Soest: Tilburg University, Department of Economics and TSC, Tilburg, the Netherlands, [email protected]. Stoop: Erasmus University Rotterdam, Department of Applied Economics, Rotterdam, the Netherlands, [email protected]. We are grateful to the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research, NWO, for financial support as part of the Program on Evolution and Behavior. We would like to thank Ad and Thea van Oirschot and Ben Willems for use of their fishing facility, and Stef van Kessel, Mike Groels, and Paul Ludeña Delgado for excellent research assistance. We thank Wieland Müller, Jan Potters, Ernan Haruvy, Amrita Ray Chaudury, Eline van der Heijden, David Voňka, Cees Withagen and especially Amos Zemel for comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. The authors declare to have no relevant or material financial interests that relate to the research described in this paper. No IRB approval has been granted because our institutions do not require it.