Fair cost-sharing methods for the minimum spanning tree game

نویسندگان

  • Eric Angel
  • Evripidis Bampis
  • Lélia Blin
  • Laurent Gourvès
چکیده

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Inf. Process. Lett.

دوره 100  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2006