Liberal Determinants of Systemic Interstate Peace∗

The success of the democratic peace research agenda has led scholars to search for additional externalities of liberal politics and economics. Among the most promising venues is the system itself. The diffusion of democratic norms or identities could discourage conflict even among nondemocracies. Yet, reconciling systemic claims with dyadic findings appears to require hypocrisy; democracies must press for peace among autocracies, while themselves continuing to use or threaten force against non-democracies. No such tension exists for other elements of the Kantian liberal triad. In particular, trade appears to consistently contribute to a systemic liberal peace. ∗I thank John Conybeare, Ewan Harrison, Carmela Lutmar, Megan Shannon, and David Sobek for helpful comments. Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the Peace Research Institute of Frankfurt (PRIF), September 18, 2006 and at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 20-23, 2006, Palmer House, Chicago. Data and a STATA “do” file replicating all analyses can be obtained from the authors upon publication. †University of California, San Diego, Department of Political Science, 9500 Gilman Ave., Room 327 Social Sciences Bldg., La Jolla, CA 92037, USA. E-mail: [email protected].