Wittgenstein on Knowledge (1949-1951)

In this paper, I want to characterize Wittgenstein’s epistemology, namely his contextualism, presented in his notes published under the title On Certainty. This characterization will be made in terms of a comparison with four control points in order to put into light the peculiarities of Wittgenstein’s epistemological position. The markers I will use for that purpose will give an indication of the level of conceptual commitment toward four important epistemological theses: holism, internalism, fallibilism, and egalitarianism. These markers have been chosen in function of the power of discrimination they provide regarding the two main trends in the past 40 years (or so) of debate in contemporary epistemology, i.e., foundationalism and coherentism. Using these conceptual markers, one can easily distinguish between strict foundationalism, which shows a low level of each markers, and strict coherentism, which shows a high level of each markers.