A Note on CEO Compensation, Elimination Tournaments and Bankruptcy Risk
نویسندگان
چکیده
We investigate an economy in which ̄rms have di®erent risks to go bankrupt. We observe two things: ̄rst, workers in ̄rms with higher bankruptcy risk (bad ̄rms) always work less than workers in good ̄rms. Second, the CEOs of bad ̄rms may nonetheless receive larger wages.
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