Folk Theorems for Repeated Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
The Fudenberg and Maskin folk theorem for discounted repeated games assumes that the set of feasible payoffs is full dimensional . We obtain the same conclusion using a weaker condition. This condition is that no pair of players has equivalent von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities over outcomes. We term this condition NEU ("non-equivalent utilities"). The condition is weak, easily interpreted, and also almost necessary for the result. We also extend our analysis to finitely repeated games and overlapping generations games.
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