Information Revelation and Acquisition in Bargaining∗
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper analyzes a model of bilateral bargaining in the presence of information flow revealing one’s bargaining posture. The equilibrium outcome of our bargaining game converges to that of the unique equilibrium of its a continuous-time limit, as players can make offers arbitrarily frequently. We characterize the equilibrium of this limiting game and develop some comparative statics regarding how equilibrium behaviors vary with the flow rate. We further enrich the benchmark model by allowing one agent to engage in costly information acquisition and analyze her incentives for acquiring information. ∗I am grateful to George Mailath...for advice... †Washington University in St. Louis; [email protected].
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