Representationalism About Consciousness
نویسندگان
چکیده
Philosophers have traditionally drawn a sharp distinction between phenomenal and intentional states. Phenomenal states are states with phenomenal or subjective character – something it’s like to be in them. The clearest examples of phenomenal states are perceptions, emotions, and sensations, which involve specific qualitative or sensory characters. Intentional states, such as beliefs, are mental states which represent something as being in a certain way. It has been commonly held that the intentional aspects of mental states lack phenomenal character while their phenomenal aspects lack intentionality. Modern representationalism about consciousness (MR) challenges this traditional distinction with the claim that phenomenal character is a species of and exhausted by representational content.
منابع مشابه
Peter Carruthers In Defence of First - Order Representationalism
Carruthers (2000; 2005) provides a general defence of reductive representationalism about phenomenal consciousness while critiquing first-order theories of the sort proposed by Baars (1988), Tye (1995), Dennett (2001), and others (thereby motivating a form of higher-order account). The present paper defends first-order theories against that attack.
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