Divide-and-Coordinate by Egalitarian Utilities: Turning DCOPs into Egalitarian Worlds
نویسندگان
چکیده
A Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem (DCOP) [7, 6] is a formal framework that can model many cooperative multi-agents domains. The Divide-and-Coordinate (DaC) framework [11] is one of the few general frameworks for solving DCOPs that provides bounds on solution quality for incomplete algorithms. In this paper, we formulate a novel DaC algorithm, the so-called Egalitarian Utilities Divide-and-Coordinate (EU-DaC) algorithm. The intuition behind EU-DaC is that agents would get closer to the agreement, that is to the optimal solution in DaC, when they communicate their local utilities for their decisions instead of their preferred decisions. We empirically show how this new algorithm outperforms DaCSA [11], the other DaC algorithm proposed so far, in all instances. We also show that it is very competitive when compared with bounded MGM k-optimal algorithms [5, 4], eventually outperforming them on some problem topologies. Our results also show how bounds provided by the DaC framework are much tighter than 2-optimal and 3-optimal bounds.
منابع مشابه
Egalitarian Utilities Divide-and-Coordinate: Stop arguing about decisions, let's share rewards!
In this paper we formulate a novel Divide-andCoordinate (DaC) algorithm, the so-called Egalitarian Utilities Divide-and-Coordinate (EU-DaC) algorithm. The Divide-andCoordinate (DaC) framework [3] is a family of bounded DCOP algorithms that solve DCOPs by exploiting the concept of agreement. The intuition behind EU-DaC is that agents get closer to an agreement, on the optimal solution, when they...
متن کاملDividing goods or bads under additive utilities
We compare the Egalitarian Equivalent and the Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes rules to divide a bundle of goods (heirlooms) or a bundle of bads (chores). For goods the Competitive division fares better, as it is Resource Monotonic, and makes it harder to strategically misreport preferences. But for bads, the Competitive rule, unlike the Egalitarian one, is multivalued, harder to comp...
متن کاملThe distributed negotiation of egalitarian resource allocations
We provide a sound theory for the computation of allocations of indivisible resources amongst cooperative agents, maximising the egalitarian social welfare of the overall multi-agent system, seen as a society. Agents’ preferences over resources are captured by scalar utilities that we sum up to define the agents’ individual welfare. The egalitarian social welfare is defined as the minimal indiv...
متن کاملCompensation and Responsibility: General Impossibilities and Possibilities
We consider a compensation problem within a responsible–sensitive egalitarian framework. We show that Arrowvian general impossibility results. However, if information about interpersonal– comparable utilities is available, this impossibility is escapable. We characterize a general class of allocation rules defined by social evaluation functions. As a corollary of our results, we obtain new char...
متن کاملEgalitarianism of Random Assignment Mechanisms
We consider the egalitarian welfare of random assignment mechanisms when agents have unrestricted cardinal utilities over the objects. We define and give bounds on how well different random assignment mechanisms approximate the optimal egalitarian value (OEV) and investigate the effect that different well-known properties like ordinality, envyfreeness, and truthfulness have on the achievable eg...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2010