Acquaintance and Skepticism about the Past

I consider the problem of skepticism about the past within Richard Fumerton’s acquaintance theory of noninferential justification. Acts of acquaintance occur within the fleeting present. But if the data for noninferential justification is limited to the fleeting present then the options for avoiding a far-reaching skepticism are quite limited. I consider Fumerton’s responses to skepticism about the past and argue that his acquaintance theory is not able to stave off skepticism about the past. Furthermore, I argue that the bounds of skepticism about the past overflow to the fleeting present by limiting the kind of content knowable within the present ‘now’. Finally, I defend an epistemic conservative response to this stark skeptical problem by arguing that it is a theoretically economical account of our justification for beliefs about the past. How long does it take you to read this sentence? Did you rely on memory at all in reading that sentence? What is the most complex thought you can entertain without relying on memory at all? These questions raise a fundamental epistemological issue concerning our ability to justify our extensive reliance on memory. Nearly every thought relies on memory. Even simple thoughts we entertain in the fleeting present—e.g., “green here now”—rely on our apparent memory that the meanings of our terms are constant and that the ‘I’ which now thinks is the same ‘I’ that thought a moment ago. My goal in this paper is to consider the epistemological problem of how our beliefs about ∗It is my pleasure to write an essay honoring Richard Fumerton’s contributions in epistemology. I have long admired the clarity and forthrightness of Richard’s philosophy. Richard brings lucid argumentation and searing honesty to difficult and fundamental philosophical problems. For comments on a previous draft I thank Michael Bergmann, Matthew Frise, Richard Fumerton and the audience at the 6th Orange Beach Epistemology Workshop.