Comprehensive Rationalizability∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We present a new solution concept for strategic games called comprehensive rationalizability that embodies a new version of “common cautious belief in rationality” based on a sound epistemic characterization in a universal type space. Differently from existing iterative strategy elimination procedures in the literature, it should rather be viewed as an iterative strategy demotion procedure as it requires some memory of previously discarded strategies. It refines rationalizability, but it neither refines nor is refined by iterated admissibility. Nevertheless, it coincides with iterated admissibility in many relevant economic applications.
منابع مشابه
A Comprehensive Approach to Revealed Preference Theory∗
We develop a version of Afriat’s Theorem that is applicable to a variety of choice environments, beyond the setting of classical consumer theory. This allows us to devise tests for rationalizability in the context of choice data on lotteries, contingent consumption, and intertemporal consumption. We also establish a version of Richter’s Theorem that characterizes the strict rationalizability of...
متن کاملRefinements of rationalizability for normal-form games
In normal-form games, rationalizability (Bernheim [3], Pearce [11]) on its own fails to exclude some very implausible strategy choices. Three main refinements of rationalizability have been proposed in the literature: cautious, perfect, and proper rationalizability. Nevertheless, some of these refinements also fail to eliminate unreasonable outcomes and suffer from several drawbacks. Therefore,...
متن کاملRe®nements of rationalizability for normal-form games*
There exist three equivalent de®nitions of perfect Nash equilibria which di ̈er in the way ``best responses against small perturbations'' are de®ned. It is shown that applying the spirit of these de®nitions to rationalizability leads to three di ̈erent re®nements of rationalizable strategies which are termed perfect (Bernheim, 1984), weakly perfect and trembling-hand perfect rationalizability, re...
متن کاملRationalizability under Uncertainty using Imprecise Probabilities ̊
The notion of imprecise probability can be viewed as a generalization of the traditional notion of probability. Several theories and models of imprecise probability have been suggested in the literature as more appropriate representations of uncertainty in the context of single-agent decision making. In this paper I investigate the question of how such models can be incorporated into the tradit...
متن کاملMaximal-Element Rationalizability∗
We examine the maximal-element rationalizability of choice functions with arbitrary domains. While rationality formulated in terms of the choice of greatest elements according to a rationalizing relation has been analyzed relatively thoroughly in the earlier literature, this is not the case for maximal-element rationalizability, except when it coincides with greatest-element rationalizability b...
متن کامل