Competitive Bundling
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper proposes a model of competitive bundling with an arbitrary number of rms. In the regime of pure bundling, we nd that relative to separate sales pure bundling tends to raise market prices, bene t rms, and harm consumers when the number of rms is above a threshold. This is in contrast to the ndings in the duopoly case on which the existing literature often focuses. Our analysis also sheds new light on how consumer valuation dispersion a¤ects price competition more generally. In the regime of mixed bundling, having more than two rms raises new challenges in solving the model. We derive the equilibrium pricing conditions and show that when the number of rms is large, the equilibrium prices have simple approximations and mixed bundling is generally pro-competitive relative to separate sales. Firms incentives to bundle are also investigated. Keywords: bundling, multiproduct pricing, product compatibility, oligopoly JEL classi cation: D43, L13, L15
منابع مشابه
FE-rapport 2001-379 Application of Price Bundling Strategies in Retail Banking in Europe
Application of price bundling strategies in retail banking in Europe is a report based on an empirical study of price bundling practices in Southern, Central and Northern Europe. The current report defines three core price bundling models that are in one form or another applied by the interviewed banks. The models are cost efficiency bundling, cross-selling bundling and loyalty bundling. Price ...
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