Compatibility in Two-sided Markets
نویسنده
چکیده
I study two-sided markets where the platform is composed of components supplied by di¤erent producers. I examine a producers incentive to provide compatibility of its product with other suppliers. Two models are considered. In the rst model, I nd that tying of a complementary product may be pro table. In the second model, I nd that a durable goods monopolists introduction of incompatibility between successive generations of products will improve social welfare if multi-homing is allowed. These results are at variance with those obtained in conventional one-sided markets. (JEL
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