Partially Observed, Multi-objective Markov Games

نویسندگان

  • Yanling Chang
  • Alan L. Erera
  • Chelsea C. White
چکیده

The intent of this research is to generate a set of non-dominated policies from which one of two agents (the leader) can select a most preferred policy to control a dynamic system that is also affected by the control decisions of the other agent (the follower). The problem is described by an infinite horizon, partially observed Markov game (POMG). The actions of the agents are selected simultaneously at each decision epoch. At each decision epoch, each agent knows: its past and present states, its past actions, and noise corrupted observations of the other agent’s past and present states. The actions of each agent are determined by the agent’s policy, which selects actions at each decision epoch based on these data. The leader considers multiple objectives in selecting its policy. The follower considers a single objective in selecting its policy with complete knowledge of and in response to the policy selected by the leader. This leader-follower assumption allows the POMG to be transformed into a specially structured, partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP). This POMDP is used to determine the follower’s best response policy. A multi-objective genetic algorithm (MOGA) is used to create the next generation of leader policies based on the fitness measures of each leader policy in the current generation. Computing a fitness measure for a leader policy requires a value determination calculation, given the leader policy and the follower’s best response policy. The policies from which the leader can select a most preferred policy are the non-dominated policies of the final generation of leader policies created

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • CoRR

دوره abs/1404.4388  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2013