Beyond Kyoto . a Game - Theoretic Perspective

Since the framework convention of Rio, actual environmental negotiations on climate change aim at inducing all world countries to sign a global environmental agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In Kyoto, a subset of countries agreed on emission reduction targets, but they are still negotiating on the way to induce the non-signatories to sign the protocol. This paper shows from a game-theoretic viewpoint that the emergence of agreements signed by all countries is quite unlikely, even in the presence of appropriate and multi-issues negotiation strategies and transfers. If countries are non-myopic, the best we can expect is a coalition structure in which multiple regional environmental agreements to control climate change are signed. Paper prepared for the OECD workshop on “Climate Change and Economic Modelling. Background Analysis for the Kyoto Protocol”, Paris, 17-18.9, 1998. Comments from the workshop participants are gratefully acknowledged.