Vito Peragine and Antonio Romero - Medina On Preference , Freedom and Diversity 0003
نویسنده
چکیده
We study the problem of ranking sets of options in terms of freedom of choice. We propose a framework in which both the diversity of the options and the preferences of the agent over the options do play a role. We formulate some axioms that re°ect these two aspects of freedom and we study their logical implications. Two di®erent criteria for ranking sets are characterized, which generalize some of the rankings proposed so far in the literature.
منابع مشابه
On Preference, Freedom and Diversity
We study the problem of ranking sets of options in terms of freedom of choice. We propose a framework in which both the diversity of the options and the preferences of the agent over the options do play a role. We formulate some axioms that reflect these two aspects of freedom and we study their logical implications. Two different criteria for ranking sets are characterized, which generalize so...
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تاریخ انتشار 2010