Doxastic Virtues in Hume’s Epistemology

In this paper, I elucidate Hume’s account of doxastic virtues and offer three reasons that contemporary epistemologists ought to consider it as an alternative to one of the broadly Aristotelian models currently offered. Specifically, I suggest that Hume’s account of doxastic virtues obviates (1) the much-debated question about whether such virtues are intellectual, “moral,” or some combination thereof, (2) the much-debated question about whether people have voluntary control of their belief formation, and (3) the need to make the kind of thick metaphysical commitments about essentialism and final causation that Aristotelian accounts of such virtues require. A lively and interesting debate has emerged over, roughly, the past century concerning the virtues, and related vices, of belief formation—that is, the process that includes the way in which people conduct their inquiries, the way in which they acquire their beliefs, and the way in which they fix their beliefs. This debate has been of special interest to philosophers working in virtue epistemology, in general, and to virtue responsibilists—who conceive of the virtues of belief formation as good character traits—in particular.1 Despite its many excellent qualities, the debate has been surprisingly narrow in at least one respect. To the extent that its participants articulate accounts of the virtues of belief formation, they tend, overwhelmingly, to employ essentially Aristotelian models.2 Notably missing from their discussions is a serious and comprehensive engagement with Hume’s account of such virtues. Rico Vitz is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Florida, 1 UNF Drive, Jacksonville, FL 32224, U.S.A. E-mail: [email protected].