Seismology and CTBT Verification
نویسنده
چکیده
It is well-known that the design and production of nuclear weapons required major efforts in scientific research and engineering, with a supporting infrastructure of weapons laboratories. Less well-known, is that scientific research and development have also played an important role in nuclear arms control. In this paper, my purpose is to explain the role of seismology in treaty verification; to describe what seismology (and associated infrastructures) can and cannot do using monitoring systems now in place; and to give a sense of what can be expected with likely future improvements. Seismology is the study of how the ground moves, not just for strong earthquakes like that which severely damaged the Stanford University campus in October 1989, but for ground motions that can be detected even a billion times smaller, caused by earthquakes and explosions which may originate on the other side of the world. Each earthquake or explosion sends out a mixture of different types of seismic waves, and for decades seismologists have been interpreting these signals in order to characterize the seismic source. Seismology has overlapping infrastructures to study the internal structure of our planet, to study earthquake hazard, and to monitor explosions. Seismology became particularly important as a monitoring technology following the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty of 1963, because nuclear testing moved underground and was found to generate easily-detectable seismic signals, observed all over the world for most nuclear tests. On average, about one nuclear explosion a week was carried out underground from the early 1960's to the early 1990's. Underground nuclear testing became an integral part of the process by which new nuclear weapons were designed and certified as ready for deployment --and seismology was built up as a practical science because it became a principal means to learn of the developing nuclear weapons capability of a potential adversary. It was also recognized to be an arms control technology for monitoring compliance with an eventual ban on nuclear testing.
منابع مشابه
Ten Years of Development of Equipment for Measurement of Atmospheric Radioactive Xenon for the Verification of the CTBT
Atmospheric measurement of radioactive xenon isotopes (radioxenon) plays a key role in remote monitoring of nuclear explosions, since it has a high capability to capture radioactive debris for a wide range of explosion scenarios. It is therefore a powerful tool in providing evidence for nuclear testing, and is one of the key components of the verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Tes...
متن کاملSeismic wave interaction with underground cavities
Motivation The Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT) aim to prohibit any nuclear explosion on Earth. For its realization a nuclear test verification strategy has to be set up, consisting of three pillars: •Monitoring • International Data Center •On-Site Inspection (OSI) OSI aims to be the ultimate tool to clarify wether or not a nuclear test has been carried out in violation of the CTBT....
متن کاملGeologic constraints on clandestine nuclear testing in South Asia.
Cavity decoupling in salt is the most plausible means by which a nation could conduct clandestine testing of militarily significant nuclear weapons. The conditions under which solution-mined salt can be used for this purpose are quite restrictive. The salt must be thick and reasonably pure. Containment of explosions sets a shallow limit on depth, and cavity stability sets a deep limit. These co...
متن کاملAutomatic and Interactive Analysis Software for Beta- Gamma Coincidence Systems Used in Ctbt Monitoring
A suite of software has been developed by Veridian Systems as part of the Prototype International Data Center (PIDC) to assist in the analysis of noble gas monitoring data for the Comprehensive Nuclear-TestBan Treaty (CTBT). There are two acceptable noble gas monitoring methods for CTBT verification purposes: high-resolution gamma-ray ( ) spectrometry and beta-gamma ( ) coincidence. Data from s...
متن کاملAdjoint backtracking for the verification of the CTBT
Adjoint backtracking for the verification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty J.-P. Issartel and J. Baverel Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées, Centre d’Enseignement et de Recherche Eau, Ville, Environnement, Champs sur Marne, France previously at: Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique, DASE, Bruyères le Châtel, France Received: 1 August 2002 – Accepted: 22 October 2002 – Published: 19 Novembe...
متن کامل