Validation of the OLSR routing table based on trust reasoning

Self organization characteristics of Mobile ad hoc networks (Manet) make traditional security solutions inapplicable. In Manet, any node can be router, and can perturb the routing operation by broadcasting incorrect topological information, making the construction of routing table, which is the primary goal of routing protocols, the more vunerable operation. Thus, in such environments, there is no guarantee that a path between two nodes would be free of misbehavior nodes, and many attacks against the routing table has the objective to perturb the network topology by making legitimate nodes store incorrect routes, so that traffic flows through a specific node (attacker). In this paper, we prove that each OLSR (Optimized link state routing protocol) node is able to validate the topology information based on trust reasonings. In our approach, when an inconsistency is detected, we guarantee that the reasoning node is able to mistrust/reject the compromised route (which constitutes a set of nodes that include those that initiate the attacks), and to identify the remote nodes that are subject to attacks.