The Industrial Organization of Money Management

We construct and analyze a model of delegated portfolio management in which money managers signal their investment skills via their choice of transparency for their fund. We show that a natural equilibrium is one in which highand low-skill managers pool in opaque funds, while medium-skill managers separate in transparent funds. In this equilibrium, high-skill managers rely on their eventual performance to separate from low-skill managers over time, saving the monitoring costs associated with transparency. In contrast, medium-skill managers rely on transparency to separate from low-skill managers, especially when it is difficult for investors to tell them apart through performance alone. Low-skill managers prefer mimicking high-skill managers in opaque funds in the hope of replicating their performance and compensation. The models yields several novel empirical predictions that contrast transparent funds (e.g., mutual funds) and opaque funds (e.g., hedge funds). The authors would like to thank Roger Edelen, Barney Hartman-Glaser, and Adriano Rampini for their comments and suggestions. Also providing useful comments and suggestions were seminar participants at Duke University, and the University of California at Davis. All remaining errors are the authors’ responsibility. Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, 100 Fuqua Drive, Durham, NC 27708-0120, [email protected], (919) 660-7683. Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, C.B. 3490, McColl Building 4117, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490, [email protected], (919) 962-8399.