Fractional Solutions for NTU-Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper we survey some applications of Scarf’s Lemma. First, we introduce the notion of fractional core for NTU-games, which is always nonempty by the Lemma. Stable allocation is a general solution concept for games where both the players and their possible cooperations can have capacities. We show that the problem of finding a stable allocation, given a finitely generated NTU-game with capacities, is always solvable by a variant of Scarf’s Lemma. Finally, we describe the interpretation of these results for matching games.
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