Addendum to Legalize, Tax, and Deter: Optimal Enforcement Policies for Corruptible Officials
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چکیده
1 Legalization and development: proofs In this section, we provide proofs for the statements made in section 5.2 of the paper: if the overall process of development increases parameter values x, h, v, f and decreases σ, the scope for legalization decreases. In section 3, we assume that development scales all parameters by a common factor β. In Section 3.1, we assume that the sensibility to corruption σ remains unchanged by development. Finally, in Section 4 we assume that x, h do not change. In all cases, we demonstrate that the scope for legalization (where the model predicts society is strictly better off due to legalization) decreases with development. In most cases, this simply means that the parameter z̃ decreases with development. 2 Key Equations. Whonest(p, w, i, f) = ∫ ∞
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تاریخ انتشار 2015