On the Coleman indices of voting power
نویسندگان
چکیده
Coleman (1971) suggested two indices of voting power, power to prevent an action and power to initiate an action. This paper rigorously demonstrates relationship between the two indices and shows that they satisfy several attractive properties. It is also shown that an attainable upper bound of the power to prevent an action can as well be regarded as a suitable voting power index.
منابع مشابه
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- European Journal of Operational Research
دوره 171 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2006