An Exploration of Competition and Cooperation through a Multi-Agent Dynamic-Game Model of Fishery Management

The interaction between economic and ecological dynamic systems is analyzed with a multi-agent dynamic game model of fishery management. Multiple actors (fishermen) harvest multiple fish types and adapt the amount and allocation of their investments to their value functions, which are given as net profits of the fish harvest sold for a market price. We introduce and compare two different decision rules in the competition of fishermen, leading to a decline both of fish stocks and profits for most fishermen. As an alternative, we introduce a cooperative approach to jointly set sustainable limits for total harvest and investment that are then distributed to the fishermen according to distribution rules. As the simulation shows, fish stocks and profits stabilize at significantly higher levels in the cooperative case, leading to a continuous accumulation of capital. Managing fishery conflicts The scarcity of natural resources is an expression of the conflicting relationship between mankind and nature. Even though environmental degradation generally may not directly lead to environmental conflicts, it could undermine the economic and societal conditions for the well-being of a growing human population, adding to the various stress factors that contribute to conflict. We discuss here the problem of overfishing in the world’s oceans which bears a considerable conflict potential (Charles 1992; Ruseski 1998).