Competition Policy, Collusion, and Tacit Collusion
نویسنده
چکیده
In this paper, I pursue three goals. The first is to model collusion in a way that is distinct from noncooperative collusion. The second and third are to develop a particular specification of a standard model of noncooperative collusion that permits explicit solution for equilibrium outputs and reversion thresholds and to extend this analysis to allow for a deterrence-based competition policy that investigates conduct based on observed high prices (investigation thresholds). © 2006 Published by Elsevier B.V. JEL classification: L40; L41
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تاریخ انتشار 2006