Corrigendum to "Stable matchings and preferences of couples" [J. Econ. Theory 121 (1) (2005) 75-106]
نویسندگان
چکیده
We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in [B. Klaus, F. Klijn, Stable matchings and preferences of couples, J. Econ. Theory 121 (2005) 75–106] or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings [KK05, Theorem 3.3] and a maximal domain result [KK05, Theorem 3.5] are adjusted accordingly. © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C78; J41
منابع مشابه
Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples∗
We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 144 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2009