Aggregate uncertainty in the citizen candidate model yields extremist parties
نویسندگان
چکیده
We extend the ‘citizen candidate’ model of party formation to allow for aggregate uncertainty over the distribution of preferences. We discuss and characterize the equilibrium set in this framework and show that two-party equilibria have ‘extremist’ parties, i.e. the party winning under a left-wing (right-wing) distribution is to the left (right) of the median of that distribution.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 36 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2011