IssuesLetter Electrical Energy Security : Policies for a Resilient Network

For the third time in a generation, our nation is focusing attention on the thorny questions of national energy security. This time, however, it isn't just concern about fuel shortages and price spikes; it is also about the potential impacts of deliberate attacks on energy facilities, including the nations power plants and electric grids. Regulators and other public officials must now assess and seek to limit the effect of these new risks, while keeping an eye on the enduring goals of utility management, including power system costs, reliability, and environmental impacts. In the companion Issuesletter, Assessing Security Risks, we discuss how electrical energy security involves a web of interconnected elements, from the security of individual power plants to gas pipeline supply routes and the architecture of regional transmission grids. In this Issuesletter we highlight policies for regulators and utilities to improve the security of the nations power systems not by building fortresses around large, fragile facilities and trying to defend thousands of miles of long-distance transmission lines but by strategically evolving a more resilient electric network. In the resilient network, physical security is not an added feature, bolted on after power plants and transmission lines are built. Rather it is an integral element of system planning and network architecture with four central features: 1. Inherent deterrence. The resilient network has few critical facilities facilities which, if lost or damaged, would lead to widespread, cascading impacts. It deters attack by offering very few effective targets. 2. Focused protection of critical features. Some electric system facilities (e.g., regional operations centers or key transformer sites) are critical to grid operations, and their loss could have widespread effects. Other facilities (e.g., large hydro stations or nuclear power plants) may not be critical to the grid but are potential threats to the public if damaged or used as weapons. In the resilient network, both types of facilities are few in number, well-protected, and their essential grid functions are supported by backup facilities. 3. Accent on distributed resources. Widespread use of distributed resources can lower stresses on the electric grid and lower the grids reliance on remote central stations and long transmission links. Just as desktop computers and local area networks have