The tripartite model of representation

Robert Cummins [(1996) Representations, targets and attitudes, Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT, p. 1] has characterized the vexed problem of mental representation as “the topic in the philosophy of mind for some time now.” This remark is something of an understatement. The same topic was central to the famous controversy between Nicolas Malebranche and Antoine Arnauld in the 17th century and remained central to the entire philosophical tradition of “ideas” in the writings of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid and Kant. However, the scholarly, exegetical literature has almost no overlap with that of contemporary cognitive science. I show that the recurrence of certain deep perplexities about the mind is a systematic and pervasive pattern arising not only throughout history, but also in a number of independent domains today such as debates over visual imagery, symbolic systems and others. Such historical and contemporary convergences suggest that the fundamental issues cannot arise essentially from the theoretical guise they take in any particular case. ... if men had been born blind philosophy would be more perfect, because it would lack many false assumptions that have been taken from the sense of sight. (Galileo Galilei, 1610) Mental representation: “the topic for some time now” Robert Cummins (1996, p. 1) has recently characterized the vexed problem of mental representation as “the topic in the philosophy of mind for some time now.” However, this remark is something of an understatement. In fact, the same topic was central to the famous controversy between Antoine Arnauld and Nicolas Malebranche in the 17th century, and also central to the entire philosophical tradition of “ideas” in the writings of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid and Kant. This pattern of recurrence is a striking fact. However, the cognitive science literature has almost no overlap with that of the history of early modern philosophy. This mutual neglect is remarkable in view of the intimate connection of their concerns. I am concerned here to reveal something of the rich and mutually illuminating connections between these disjoint literatures. In principle, such mutual illumination can make a valuable and perhaps novel contribution both to contemporary cognitive science and also to the scholarship of early modern philosophy. The possibility of mutual bene!t is even Peter Slezak, Program in Cognitive Science, School of History & Philosophy of Science, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia, email: [email protected] ISSN 0951-5089/print/ISSN 1465-394X/online/02/030239–32 Ó 2002 Taylor & Francis Ltd DOI: 10.1080/0951508021000006085