European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy

The central argument of this paper is that moral perfectionism cannot be understood in its radical philosophical, ethical and political dimensions unless we trace its tradition back to the ancient Greek conception of philosophy as a way of life. Indeed, in ancient Greece, to be a philosopher meant to give importance to everyday life and to pay attention to the details of common language and behaviour, in order to actively transform oneself and one’s relationship to others and to the world. Truth itself was conceived as an event emerging from the agreement among the logoi of different people, or from the harmony established by an individual between his words and his deeds (e.g. Socrates, the Cynics). But this way of conceiving truth and practicing philosophy has been somehow put aside in modern times, and it has been renewed only during the last two centuries, primarily thanks to the transcendental American philosophy of Emerson and Thoreau. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to show how modern perfectionism re-invented ancient perfectionism, through the re-activation of the imperative to pay attention to our ordinary words and everyday life (and to their harmonic relation), linked to a truth always meant as a practice. My conclusion will be that moral perfectionism can be conceived and still practiced, today, as an ethics and politics of responsibility, i.e. of attention to and care for the ordinary. “What I must do is all that concerns me, not what the people think. This rule, equally arduous in actual and in intellectual life, may serve for the whole distinction between greatness and meanness.” R.W. Emerson, Self-Reliance I. Ancient Perfectionism “All that concerns me” is my everyday life My central argument in this paper will be that moral perfectionism cannot be understood in its radical philosophical, ethical and political dimensions unless we trace its tradition back to the ancient Greek conception of philosophy as a way of life. Hence, to begin, I will argue that the Emersonian maxim quoted above, “what I must do is all that concerns me, not what the people think” 1 Emerson 1841: 143. , far from being simply a Romantic, self-centered claim of the uniqueness and value of the individual, constitutes on the contrary the reactivation of a more ancient principle, which resides at the very basis of the Western philosophical tradition. Ancient philosophy is in fact entirely traversed by the imperative of separating carefully what does concern us, because it is in our power, from what does not, precisely because it is not in our power. It is the well-known ancient struggle of man against the unpredictability of Fate (Tyche), which takes the form of a series of typical couples of opposites – DANIELE LORENZINI MUST WE DO WHAT WE SAY? _________________________________________________________________________ ISSN: 2036-4091 2010, II, 2 17 soul versus body, inward goods versus outward goods, knowledge versus opinion, wise man versus common man, etc. The purpose of these pairs of opposites is clear: defining, within the framework of human life, a space that is separate from the dominance of Fate, in which man can consequently find his ‘truth’ (what is essential to him), his autonomy and his freedom – in a word, the place of human happiness. Ancient philosophy, then, is a matter of what matters, a matter of knowing what matters for me and being able to construct my conduct and life on this basis. This fundamental feature of ancient philosophy is particularly evident in Stoic philosophy, founded – as it is well known – on a preliminary distinction between what is in our power and what is not. A theoretical distinction that the Stoics translate immediately into a practical rule: what matters for us, because it is in our power, is only moral good or evil – that is, doing the (moral) good and avoiding to do the (moral) evil. Everything else, strictly speaking, does not matter for us (because it is not in our power), and so it must be considered indifferent. The opening chapter of the Manual of Epictetus is very explicit on this: Of things, some are in our power, and others are not. In our power are: discernment, impulsion to act, desire, aversion and, in a word, whatever are our own acts. Not in our power are the body, property, reputation, public offices and, in a word, whatever are not our own acts. And the things in our power are by nature free, not subject to restraint, nor hindrance; but the things not in our power are weak, slavish, subject to restraint, in the control of others. Remember then that if you think the things which are by nature slavish to be free, and the things which are in the power of others to be your own, you will be hindered in your action, you will lament, you will be disturbed, you will blame both gods and men. On the contrary, if you think that only which is your own to be your own, and if you think that what is another’s, as it really is, belongs to another, no man will ever compel you, no man will hinder you, you will never blame anyone, you will accuse no one, you will do nothing against your will, no one will harm you, you will have no enemy – for you will not suffer any harm. Manifestly, it is not just a matter of theoretical knowledge. On the contrary, Stoic philosophy incites men to learn and memorize a set of essential principles, which aim to govern in detail the practice of their everyday life. Therefore, these rational principles of behaviour do not have to remain at the level of logos, of pure discourse, but rather (to use Michel Foucault’s words) they have to be “subjectivated” through a series of specific “ascetic techniques” , in order to make them coincide with the ethos of the subject – that is, in order to orient his practical conduct. Hence, following Pierre Hadot, we shall conceive ancient philosophy essentially as a choice and a way of life, rather than a theoretical discourse. Or better, in ancient philosophy, theoretical discourse is never considered an end in itself, but it is always clearly and decidedly put in the service of practice, i.e. of a certain way of living and being 2 Epictetus 1991: 11 (translation partially revised). 3 Foucault uses this expression to point at the “more or less coordinated set of exercises that are available, recommended and even obligatory, and anyway utilizable by individuals in a moral, philosophical and religious system in order to achieve a definitive spiritual objective”, i.e. “a certain transformation, a certain transfiguration of themselves as subjects”; Foucault 1981-82: 398 (416-417). 4 Cf. Ibid.: 318 (334). See also Foucault 1984b: 1532. 5 Cf. Hadot 1995: 271 (60). . Ancient philosophy is “an exercise of the thought, will, and the totality of one’s being”, it is “a method of spiritual progress”, which demands “a radical conversion and transformation of the individual’s way of being”. Its goal is the achievement of a definite DANIELE LORENZINI MUST WE DO WHAT WE SAY? _________________________________________________________________________ ISSN: 2036-4091 2010, II, 2 18 existential state: wisdom. Following these suggestions, in the first lecture of L’herméneutique du sujet, Foucault defines ‘spirituality’ (as opposed to ‘philosophy’) as “the search, practice and experience through which the subject carries out the necessary transformations on himself in order to have access to the truth” or, as he says in an later interview, to have access to a certain mode of being This is why the ancient philosopher is someone who, despite what other people think and do (and ergo, despite the risk of being considered odd), does not miss the importance of his everyday life. On the contrary, he cares for his life – for every single, low and apparently meaningless detail of it – because his life is precisely what concerns him, what matters for him, what deserves all his attention and ethical work. As Emerson says, the (arduous) application of this distinction between what concerns me and what the people think allows us to discriminate “between greatness and meanness”, that is, between philosophers – who take seriously the fundamental question of ancient ethics, “How ought I to live?” . Hence, Foucault speaks of ‘spirituality’ when it is the life of man – not in its biological sense (zoé), but rather in its ethical, political and social sense (bios) – that becomes the main object of his care (epimeleia), as well as the real stake (enjeu) of his work of transformation and transfiguration practiced on himself. 9 – and other people, who fail to notice the importance and practical consequences of such a question. This rule, according to Emerson, is so arduous to apply because “it is easy in the world to live after the world’s opinion”, as it is easy “in solitude to live after our own”; but “the great man” is only “he who in the midst of the crowd keeps with perfect sweetness the independence of solitude” – a solitude that, consequently, “must not be mechanical, but spiritual, that is, must be elevation” . In other words, and to bring this rule to its utmost consequences: since the social virtue most requested is conformity, “whoso would be a man, must be a nonconformist” On the (perfectionist) relation between words and deeds . Which is also the coherent conclusion of ancient philosophy understood as ‘spirituality’ (i.e. a way of life), as Foucault clearly shows in his 1984 lectures at the Collège de France, dedicated to the figure of Socrates and, later, to ancient Cynicism. Plato’s Laches is the fundamental text to consider if we want to understand how Socrates’ philosophical discourse, his practice of truth-telling (parrhesia), can be combined with his effort to care for the meanest details of his everyday life. In fact, the “style of life”, the “form that we give to life”, constitute the essential object of Socratic parrhesia: as Nicias explains, in the Laches, Socrates’ interlocutor is always “led by the Socratic logos into ‘giving an account’ (didonai logon) of ‘himself, of the manner in which he now spends his days, and of the kind of life he has lived hitherto’” 6 “La philosophie apparaissait ainsi comme un exercice de la pensée, de la volonté, de tout l’être, pour essayer de parvenir à un état, la sagesse, qui était d’ailleurs presque inaccessible à l’homme. La philosophie était une méthode de progrès spirituel qui exigeait une conversion radicale, une transformation radicale de la manière d’être”; Ibid.: 290 (265). 7 Foucault 1981-82: 16 (15). 8 Cf. Foucault 1984b: 1541. 9 Annas 1995: 27. 10 Emerson 1841: 143 (emphasis added). 11 Ibid.: 154. 12 Ibid.: 141. 13 Cf. Foucault 1984a: 134. 14 Foucault 1983a: 96. . ‘Giving an account’ of ourselves DANIELE LORENZINI MUST WE DO WHAT WE SAY? _________________________________________________________________________ ISSN: 2036-4091 2010, II, 2 19 means, then, ‘giving an account’ of the way we live and, in order to do it, “submitting” our life “to a touchstone, to a test (épreuve) which enables us to distinguish the good we have done from the evil we have done, in the course of our existence”. In this way, it is possible to examine and determine the true nature of the relation between words (logoi) and life (bios), since Socrates asks his interlocutor to demonstrate precisely whether he is able to show the harmony between the rational discourse he uses and the way in which he lives. Here, the touchstone (basanos) to test such a harmony, i.e. “the degree of accord between a person’s life and its principle of intelligibility”, is not constituted by the homologia understood as agreement between the discourses (logoi) of two or more interlocutors – as in the Gorgias Socrates is able to use rational, ethically valuable, fine, and beautiful discourse; but unlike the sophist, he can use parrhesia and speak freely because what he says accords exactly with what he thinks, and what he thinks accords exactly with what he does. . The basanos is rather represented by Socrates himself, who manifests through his way of living a perfectly harmonic relation, a perfect homologia, between his words and his deeds: